



Department of State
EXCISE
TELEGRAM

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1873
INFO CINCPAC POLAD HAWAII

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 KABUL 1837

LIMDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, OGEN, AF
SUBJ: ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT
REF: A. STATE 2050; B. KABUL 08051 C. KABUL 07781
D. KABUL 1090 (21FEB74)

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SUMMARY: EMBASSY KABUL HAS COMPLETED THE ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT REVIEW. IN ADDITION TO ASSESSING U.S. INTERESTS AND GOALS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM HAVE PARTICIPATED IN A REVIEW OF THE U.S. MISSION PERSONNEL AND PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND HAVE CLEARED THIS CABLE. THE CONCLUSION IS THAT FUNDAMENTAL U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS AND ARE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE IN THE NEXT 12-24 MONTHS, ASSUMING THE CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT DAOUD REGIME. SOME REORIENTATION OF RESOURCES MAY BE POSSIBLE, BUT PRESENT LEVELS OF BUDGET AND PERSONNEL SEEM APPROPRIATE TO OUR OVERALL MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN. THIS YEAR'S REVIEW HAS BROUGHT OUT CONCERNS WITHIN THE U.S. MISSION ON THE STYLE OF THE U.S. PRESENCE AND THE SUITABILITY OF SOME PROGRAMS. BACK-UP PAPERS ARE BEING FORWARDED UNDER COVER OF AN AIRGRAM.
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END SUMMARY.

1. THE SETTING. AS INDICATED IN REFS B AND C, OUR VIEW IS THAT PRESIDENT DAOUD IS IN VIRTUALLY COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE LEVERS OF POWER IN AFGHANISTAN, IS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION IN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND IS TRYING TO IMPLEMENT A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. THE EXISTENCE OF A RELATIVELY (IN AFGHAN TERMS) STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ATTACHING A HIGH PRIORITY TO AN EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM REPRESENTS A POSITIVE CHANGE FROM THE SITUATION THAT EXISTED TWO YEARS AGO.

UNDER THE DAOUD REGIME, AFGHANISTAN IS A SUSPICIOUS, CLOSED SOCIETY, CHARACTERIZED BY FEAR OF STRANGERS AND A POLICE STATE ATMOSPHERE. THESE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DAOUD REGIME ARE NOT UNIQUE IN AFGHAN HISTORY, BUT ARE WIDELY PERCEIVED BY AFGHANS AS REFLECTIVE OF HIS PERSONAL STYLE. IN ANY EVENT, CONTACTS WITH FOREIGNERS ARE CLOSELY MONITORED AND CONTROLLED, AND THIS AFFECTS ALL OUR MISSION PROGRAMS.

2. U.S. OBJECTIVES. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE STATEMENT OF U.S. OBJECTIVES ON PP 5-6 OF NSCIG/NEA 69-23 IS VALID. TO SUMMARIZE THOSE OBJECTIVES, THEY INCLUDE AN INDEPENDENT (MEANING NOT A COMMUNIST SATELLITE) AFGHANISTAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSER AFGHAN REGIONAL TIES, ESPECIALLY WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN. AN INDEPENDENT AFGHANISTAN REQUIRES LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET INFLUENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY THROUGH POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

3. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES.

A. OUR INTEREST IN AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN AMPLY DEMONSTRATED IN THE PAST YEAR THROUGH OUR PROGRAMS IN THE COUNTRY AND THROUGH EXCHANGES OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS. THE U.S. "PRESENCE" HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN ASSISTING AFGHANISTAN IN LIMITING ITS DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR AND HENCE IN ASSURING ITS INDEPENDENCE.

BECAUSE INTERNAL AFGHAN STABILITY DEPENDS TO SOME EXTENT ON THE PERCEPTION BY AFGHANS OF THEIR GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE, TO THIS EXTENT WE HAVE ASSISTED THAT STABILITY.

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MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNAL STABILITY INsofar AS IT ASSISTS THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT TO MEET THE EXPECTATIONS OF AFGHANS FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

B. AFGHANISTAN'S TIES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, EXCEPT FOR PAKISTAN, HAVE BEEN IMPROVED IN THE PAST YEAR. ESPECIALLY NOTABLE IN TERMS OF U.S. OBJECTIVES HAS BEEN THE WARMING OF AFGHAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS. WE CANNOT TAKE MUCH CREDIT FOR THESE DEVELOPMENTS, BUT CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THEM. OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE AFGHAN-PAK RELATIONS HAVE NOT, HOWEVER, BEEN FRUITFUL, LARGELY AS A RESULT OF OVERWEENING AFGHAN INTEREST IN THE WESTERN BORDER AREAS OF PAKISTAN AND PAKISTANI SENSITIVITY TO THIS. THE FEBRUARY 1975 CRACKDOWN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN ON OPPOSITION ELEMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY WITH ITS PUSHTUN ADHERENTS, FOR WHICH THE AFGHANS HAVE SPECIAL REGARD, HAS RECENTLY EXACERBATED THIS LONG-STANDING AND INTRACTABLE PROBLEM. WHILE IT IS FAINTLY POSSIBLE THAT A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CAN BE STARTED IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, THE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ARE SO BASIC THAT WE CAN REALISTICALLY EXPECT LITTLE MORE FROM ANY SUCH DIALOGUE THAN A GRADUAL EASING OF TENSION AND THE AVOIDANCE OF A MAJOR DISRUPTION IN THEIR RELATIONS.

4. FUTURE POLICY ISSUES.

A. THE PRINCIPAL POLICY ISSUE FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS AS IN THE PAST WILL BE HOW THE U.S. CAN INFLUENCE AFGHAN-PAK RELATIONS SO AS TO PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY. GIVEN THE INTRACTABILITY OF THE PROBLEM AND OUR LIMITED INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN (AS WE BECOME INVOLVED WITH SALES OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN WE MAY HAVE SLIGHTLY MORE INFLUENCE IN ISLAMABAD), OUR APPROACH TO THE GOA WILL BE CONFINED TO QUIET DIPLOMATIC SUASION, POINTING OUT OPPORTUNITIES FOR RECONCILIATION AND THE DANGERS OF CONFRONTATION. WE SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE THE INDIANS, IRANIANS, AND ARAB COUNTRIES TO COUNSEL MODERATION AND RECONCILIATION. WE SHOULD NOT BE OVERLY SANGUINE ABOUT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS FOR THESE EFFORTS, BUT WE SHOULD KEEP AT IT.

B. ON A MORE GLOBAL BASIS, WE INTEND TO MONITOR AFGHANISTAN'S PERFORMANCE IN WORLD ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA AND TO REMIND THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN ON APPROPRIATE OCCASIONS THAT AFGHANISTAN'S VERSION OF NON-ALIGNMENT SHOULD NOT

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MEAN KNEE-JERK OPPOSITION TO U.S. WORLD INTERETS.

5. DISSENTING VIEWS. AS IN 1973-74, THE MISSION CONDUCTED A POLICY AND PROGRAM REVIEW OUTSIDE OF AGENCY CHANNELS. THIS YEAR'S REVIEW GROUP FOUND LITTLE TO DISAGREE WITH IN THE COUNTRY TEAM'S VIEW OF BASIC POLICY ISSUES, BUT RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE APPROPRIATE USE OF RESOURCES AND PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE STYLE OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, INDICATING AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT WE MAY BE OVER-SUPPORTING OUR OFFICIAL COMMUNITY, THEREBY INSULATING THEM FROM AFGHAN CULTURE. THIS IS CONSIDERED IN THE ELEMENT-BY-ELEMENT REVIEW WHICH FOLLOWS.

THE REVIEW GROUP ALSO REITERATED THE VIEW THAT PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS ARE ONE OF OUR BEST RESOURCES FOR GIVING AFGHANS A TRUE PICTURE OF THE UNITED STATES. MANY IN THE REVIEW GROUP QUESTION WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE OVER-EMPHASIZING PROJECT DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF DETERMINING THE VALUE OF THE PEACE CORPS IN AFGHANISTAN.

6. THERE FOLLOWS A SUMMARY REVIEW OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE MISSION. INDIVIDUAL PAPERS ON EACH ELEMENT AND THE STATEMENT OF THE GROUP THAT UNDERTOOK THIS YEAR'S REVIEW OF THE MISSION'S OBJECTIVES, PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES ARE BEING FORWARDED UNDER COVER OF AN AIRGRAM.

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7. CHANCERY

A. EMBASSY MANAGEMENT. STIMULATED BY A HELPFUL STATE INSPECTION IN THE SUMMER OF 1974, OUR ADMINISTRATIVE COUNSELOR HAS BEEN CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES IN OUR ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM--ESPECIALLY THE GENERAL SERVICES SECTION AND THE COMMISSARY OPERATION. WITH ASSISTANCE FROM NEA/EX AND FROM THE COMMUNITY HERE, WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN SOLVING PROBLEMS WHICH THE INSPECTORS IDENTIFIED.

IN GENERAL, OUR SUPPORT FROM WASHINGTON HAS BEEN GOOD. THE ONLY AREA WHICH WE BELIEVE REQUIRES IMPROVEMENT IS BUDGET MANAGEMENT--WHICH WE REALIZE IS NOT ENTIRELY CONTROLLABLE BY NEA. BUT (FOR EXAMPLE) HAVING TO WITHHOLD REIMBURSEMENT FOR R&R BECAUSE OF A 3RD QUARTER BUDGET SQUEEZE AT A POST WHERE R&R IS IMPORTANT TO EFFICIENT PERFORMANCE. IS A MEASURE I HOPE WE WILL NOT HAVE TO REPEAT.

THE AID OFFICE COMPOUND LEASE EXPIRES IN 1980 AND THE CHANCERY HAS BEEN COORDINATING A MISSION-WIDE LONG-TERM LOOK AT THE CONSEQUENCES. WE HAVE INFORMALLY ASKED NEA/EX TO DISCUSS WITH FRO THE FEASIBILITY OF BUILDING A COMMISSARY AND A DISPENSARY ON US GOVERNMENT OWNED PROPERTY ADJACENT TO THE CHANCERY. BOTH FACILITIES ARE NOT LOCATED IN RATHER DILAPIDATED BUILDINGS ON THE AID-LEASED

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COMPOUND. I FEEL THAT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO HAVE THE DISPENSARY AND THE COMMISSARY LOCATED ON U.S. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY. IT IS ALSO FIVE MILES BETWEEN THE CHANCERY AND THE AID COMPOUND. IF THERE IS A POSSIBILITY FOR THE LONGER TERM CONSOLIDATION OF AID EMBASSY RESOURCES AND FACILITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE TERMINATION OF THE AID COMPOUND LEASE, THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR SAVINGS IN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE COSTS. BUT FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT TWO FISCAL YEARS, WE SEE NO POSSIBILITIES FOR REDUCTION IN THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF OUR ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION.

B. OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EMBASSY. THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CONSULAR SECTIONS FULFILLED THEIR ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITIES DURING THE PAST YEAR DESPITE PERSONNEL SHORTAGES. THE POLITICAL SECTION IS PLANNING TO SUPPLEMENT ITS ACTIVITIES DURING 1978 WITH THE PRODUCTION OF A NUMBER OF BASIC STUDIES ON AFGHAN POLITICS. THE ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL SECTION HOPES ITS PAST YEARS

ACTIVITIES WILL BEAR FRUIT IN THE NEW YEAR IN A SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER PRIVATE U.S. PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN FLOWING FROM NEW AID MONEY AVAILABLE TO THE GOA FROM OPEC COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, PROGRESS IN U.S. INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES REMAINS LARGELY A POTENTIAL RATHER THAN AN ACTUALITY. THE CONSULAR SECTION PLANS TO DO MORE REPORTING AND IN-DEPTH STUDIES OF THE NEEDS OF AMERICANS HERE.

B. DEFENSE ATTACHE (DATT) THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S OFFICE WAS ABLE, IN A CLOSED AND SUSPICIOUS SOCIETY, TO MAINTAIN FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH AFGHAN MILITARY OFFICERS

[REDACTED] (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(F)

THIS OFFICE HAS CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE ABILITY OF THE AMBASSADOR AND ALL MISSION ELEMENTS BETTER TO UNDERSTAND AFGHANISTAN OUTSIDE OF KABUL, TO MAKE THE US PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WIDELY VISIBLE, AND TO ADVANCE ALL OF THE US INTERESTS LAID OUT IN THE NSC/IG PAPER.

THE SMALL MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM PLAYS AN INDISPENSABLE ROLE IN PROVIDING THE U.S. WITH CONTACT WITH THE AFGHAN MILITARY, THE FOUNDATION OF THE DAUD REGIME'S POWER.

9. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (DEA). HALTING THE TRAFFICKING OF

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NARCOTICS FROM AFGHANISTAN REMAINS AN IMPORTANT U.S. INTEREST. THE DEA OFFICE HAS FORGED COOPERATIVE LINKS WITH THE UN-ASSISTED ANTI NARCOTICS PROGRAM, AND THROUGH THE UN NARCOTICS ADVISOR HAS SOUGHT A FLOW OF INFORMATION, ASSISTANCE AND PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH AFGHAN OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT. THERE MAY BE SCOPE FOR SOME BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THIS AREA AS WELL.

IN THE NEXT YEAR, WITH A MANDATE FROM STATE AND DEA, THE OFFICE HERE WILL CONCENTRATE ON MAKING THE LINK THROUGH THE UN MORE PRODUCTIVE. CHANNEL FURTHER ASSISTANCE [REDACTED] TO AFGHANISTAN THROUGH THE UN, AND ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES WITHOUT NECESSARILY INSISTING ON BILATERAL PROGRAMS BETWEEN THE US AND AFGHANISTAN. (S)

10. THE US INFORMATION

AIM OF USIS IN AFGHANISTAN IS TO SUPPORT US WORLDWIDE AND IN-COUNTRY MISSION OBJECTIVES. USIS ACTIVITIES INCLUDE: DISSEMINATION OF FACTUAL MATERIAL REGARDING THE US AND ITS POLICIES; A CULTURAL PROGRAM, INCLUDING EXCHANGE PROGRAMS MANAGED BY THE AFGHAN-AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL COMMISSION; AN INFORMATION CENTER THAT INCLUDES A KABUL LIBRARY AND A LARGE ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROGRAM.

USIS PLACEMENT EFFORTS HAVE RESULTED IN THE APPEARANCE OF A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIVE TEXTS, BACKGROUNDERS AND FEATURES IN THE VERNACULAR PRESS. GOA CENSORSHIP OF THE MEDIA DOES AT TIMES ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO PLACE OR DISTRIBUTE USIA MATERIAL, ESPECIALLY THAT WHICH IS CONSIDERED CRITICAL OF OTHERS (E.G., PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM).

PROGRAMS PORTRAYING US CULTURE AND UNDERSCORING US SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE HAVE MET WITH MIXED RESULTS. THIS IS BECAUSE THE FEARS, SUSPICIONS AND AUTHORITARIANISM INTERWOVEN IN THE FABRIC OF AFGHAN CULTURE AND GOVERNMENT SERVE TO INHIBIT, GENERALLY, AFGHAN CONTACT WITH FOREIGNERS. AUDIENCE PARTICIPATION IN USIS PROGRAMS IS AFFECTED CONSTANTLY BY THIS, TO VARYING DEGREES, AS THE INTERNAL POLITICAL CLIMATE CHANGES.

AS THE PRESENT REGIME ENDURES WITH STABILITY AND INCREASING SELF-CONFIDENCE, MORE NORMAL AUDIENCE PARTICIPATION AND INCREASING

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USIS PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS MAY BE POSSIBLE.

ONE WAY FOR USIS AND THE US TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN THIS DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT WOULD BE TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF APPROPRIATE CULTURAL PRESENTATIONS. THE MISSION IS DISAPPOINTED THAT (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE JUBILEE SINGERS) IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT FOR CU TO RESPOND TO OUR REQUESTS FOR SUCH SPECIAL PROGRAMS IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS.

USIS IS SUFFERING FROM THE EFFECTS OF A SUBSTANTIAL BUDGET REDUCTION THAT HINDERS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE POST'S ABILITY TO FULLY RESPOND TO EVERY PUBLIC RELATIONS OPPORTUNITY. I HAVE ASKED THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO ME ON WAYS HIS NON-PROGRAM COSTS MIGHT BE REDUCED. IF WAYS ARE FOUND TO REDUCE FIXED COSTS, I HOPE THE DEPARTMENT AND USIA WILL SUPPORT US IN KEEPING THE SAVINGS HERE FOR USE IN LOCAL USIS PROGRAMS AS AN OFFSET TO THE REDUCTIONS.

11. PEACE CORPS. THE PEACE CORPS ATTEMPTS TO USE ITS PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS AND MAKE POSSIBLE MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE BETWEEN AFGHANS AND AMERICANS IN BASIC DEVELOPMENT AREAS.

THE PEACE CORPS HAS HAD A FRUSTRATING YEAR, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN ITS (THE GOA'S) WISHES AND GOA PROGRAMMING PREFERENCES FOR PEACE CORPS AFGHANISTAN, AND SECONDARILY AND RELATEDLY BECAUSE ATTEMPTS TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SEVERAL ATTRACTIVE PROGRAMMING AREAS HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL. BECAUSE OF THE COLLAPSE IN 1973-74 OF SOME MAJOR HEALTH AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTS AND NON-REPLACEMENT OF VOLUNTEERS IN OTHER PROJECTS, ENGLISH TEACHING NOW FORMS A LARGER, MORE PREDOMINANT SHARE OF THE TOAL PROGRAM. THIS PRESENT BALANCE AMONG PEACE CORPS PROGRAM AREA IS NOT OUR PREFERENCE. BUT HIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN WE HAVE DECIDED THAT THE DISPROPORTIONATELY LARGE PROJECTS/PROGRAMS IN TEFL ARE THEMSELVES INHERENTLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY UNSATISFACTORY. TO MAKE BETTER INFORMED JUDGEMENTS ON THE VALUE OF PARTICULAR PROGRAMS, DURING THE YEAR PEACE CORPS/AFGHANISTAN HAS SOUGHT TO DEVELOP AND/OR SHARPEN PROGRAM/

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PROJECT QUALITY CRITERIA, EMBRACING THE PEACE CORPS GOALS ABOVE. SUCH JUDGEMENTS WILL OF COURSE GUIDE OUR ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND, REDUCE OR PHASEOUT PARTICULAR PROJECTS OR PROGRAM AREAS. WHAT IS MORE FUNDAMENTALLY DISTURBING IS THE OVERALL PROGRAMMING CLIMATE WHICH MAKES PROGRAM PLANNING EVOLUTION AND ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULT WITH EVEN THE BEST OF OUR PRESENT PROGRAMMING CONTACTS. AND A HARDENING OR WORSENING OF THIS PRESENT PROGRAMMING CLIMATE (SEE SECTION 1, ABOVE) COULD WARRANT A DECISION TO WITHDRAW ENTIRELY FROM AFGHANISTAN.

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11. PEACE CORPS. THE PEACE CORPS ATTEMPTS TO USE ITS PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS AND MAKE POSSIBLE MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE BETWEEN AFGHANS AND AMERICANS IN BASIC DEVELOPMENT AREAS.

THE PEACE CORPS HAS HAD A FRUSTRATING YEAR, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN ITS (THE GOA'S) WISHES AND GOA PROGRAMMING PREFERENCES FOR PEACE CORPS AFGHANISTAN, AND SECONDARILY AND RELATEDLY BECAUSE ATTEMPTS TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SEVERAL ATTRACTIVE PROGRAMMING AREAS HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL. BECAUSE OF THE COLLAPSE IN 1973-74 OF SOME MAJOR HEALTH AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTS AND NON-REPLACEMENT OF VOLUNTEERS IN OTHER PROJECTS, ENGLISH TEACHING NOW FOR MS

A LARGER, MORE PREDOMINANT SHARE OF THE TOTAL PROGRAM. THIS PRESENT BALANCE

AMONG PEACE CORPS PROGRAM AREAS IS NOT OUR PREFERENCE. BUT THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN WE HAVE DECIDED THAT THE DISPROPORTIONATELY

LARGE PROJECTS/PROGRAMS IN TEFL ARE THEMSELVES INHERENTLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY UNSATISFACTORY. TO MAKE BETTER INFORMED JUDGEMENTS ON THE VALUE OF PARTICULAR PROGRAMS, DURING THE YEAR PEACE CORPS/AFGHANISTAN HAS SOUGHT TO DEVELOP AND/OR SHARPEN PROGRAM/

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HOWEVER, PEACE CORPS CONTINUES TO RECEIVE FROM OFFICIALS OF AFGHAN OPERATING AGENCIES EXPRESSIONS OF THEIR WISHES FOR VOLUNTEERS IN PROGRAMS OF INTEREST TO PEACE CORPS. ALSO NEW GOA REFORMS IN THE FIELDS OF VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TEACHER TRAINING MAY PROVIDE NEW ROLES FOR VOLUNTEERS. THESE UNFORECLOSED POSSIBILITIES AND THE VERY GREAT NEEDS OF AFGHANISTAN JUSTIFY CONTINUED PROGRAMMING EXPLORATIONS.

12. US AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID). USAID IS THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT IN THE US MISSION FOR DEMONSTRATING AND IMPLEMENTING US INTEREST IN AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT AND THEREFORE IN AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE. USAID HAS COMPLETED MAJOR RE-EXAMINATION OF ITS PROGRAMS AND IDEAS IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT (FAA) OF 1973. IN THE COMING YEAR, USAID WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS PROGRAMS WHICH WILL IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF THE RURAL MASSES OF AFGHANISTAN, ATTEMPTING TO FIND, WITH THE GOA, PROGRAMS WHICH BEST MATCH AFGHAN PRIORITIES WHILE SATISFYING THE TERMS OF THE FAA. I BELIEVE THAT THE PROGRAMS AID HAS RECOMMENDED IN THE FIELDS OF HEALTH/FAMILY PLANNING AND EDUCATION HAVE THE GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR REWARDS IN SOCIAL SERVICES, WHILE THE PLANNED PROGRAMS OF FEEDER ROADS, MINOR IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE WILL MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO FOOD AND INCOME PRODUCTION. SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANNED AID-ASSISTED PROGRAMS AFFECTING MAJOR SEGMENTS OF THE RURAL POPULATION WILL REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN GOA BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY WITH THE ATTENDANT NECESSARY POLICY DECISIONS. SOME BILATERAL TENSIONS, HOPEFULLY ULTIMATELY CONSTRUCTIVE, WILL ARISE AS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE DIFFICULT PROGRAMS REQUIRES ACTION RATHER THAN RHETORIC.

FOLLOWING THE VISITS OF AID ADMINISTRATOR PARKER AND

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ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR NOOTER, AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE AFGHAN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN THE HELMAND VALLEY, WE HAVE RECOMMENDED NEW AID PROGRAMS IN THAT REGION. IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO OVERALL US OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN TO BE SURE THAT, HAVING ENCOURAGED THE GOA TO BELIEVE WE WILL RESUME ASSISTANCE TO THE HELMAND VALLEY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, WE FOLLOW THROUGH WITH RESULTS.

13. GENERAL COMMENTS -- STYLE/PRESENCE. A CONCERN IN EXAMINING ALL PROGRAMS AND AGENCY PLANS FOR THE COMING YEAR IS THE "STYLE" OF THE US PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. IN SUCH BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS AS HOUSING, THE MISSION IS UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE SIZE, APPEARANCE, LOCATION, FURNISHINGS, ETC., OF THE HOUSES CURRENTLY OCCUPIED, CONTINUING TO SEEK TO AVOID WHAT AFGHANS MIGHT REGARD AS OSTENTATIONS OR "GHETTO-IZATION" IN HOW WE LIVE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT AN ASSIGNMENT TO KABUL POSES REAL HARDSHIPS FOR ALL PEOPLE DUE TO THE POST'S ISOLATION, ITS CONSIDERABLE HEALTH HAZARDS, AND ITS POLICE-STATE ATMOSPHERE. IN EXAMINING THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES SUPPLIED TO PERSONNEL OF THIS MISSION, WE WILL BEAR IN MIND THE NEED TO PROVIDE THE TYPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN ACCEPTABLE LIVING STANDARDS IN THIS DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT.

I HAVE ASKED THE US MISSION'S JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE, CHAIRED BY THE DCM, TO REVIEW HOUSING AND GENERAL SERVICES AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON WAYS WE CAN IMPROVE OUR USE OF US GOVERNMENT RESOURCES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED ABOVE AND THE LONG TERM NEEDS OF THE MISSION OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

I ALSO BELIEVE IT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT OUR LANGUAGE PROGRAM BE CONTINUED AND EXPANDED TO USE LANGUAGE SKILLS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO SERVE THE SUBSTANTIVE AND CULTURAL COMMUNICATION OBJECTIVES OF OUR OFFICERS.

14. PERSONNEL AND BUDGET PROJECTIONS--1976, 1977. THE STATE, USIS, PEACE CORPS AND DEA COMPLEMENTS WILL CONTINUE AT THE SAME LEVEL PROJECTED THROUGH FY 78. HOWEVER, COSTS WILL INCREASE DUE TO WORLD-WIDE INFLATION. DAO PROJECTS A REDUCTION IN AMERICAN STAFF FROM 10 TO 8 IN FY 1977 DUE TO REPLACEMENT OF THE PRESENT AIRCRAFT BY A SMALLER AIRPLANE. CURRENT ESTIMATES SHOW AID DIRECT HIRE AND CONTRACT STRENGTH AT 104 IN FY 76, 92 IN FY 77, AND 71 IN FY 78; HOWEVER, FISCAL YEARS 77 AND 78 ARE UNDOUBTEDLY UNDER-

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STATE IF PROJECTS NOW BEING DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE US AND THE GOA
MATERIALIZE.

COMPLETE PROJECTIONS FOR MISSION STAFFING AND FUNDING
REQUIREMENTS FOR FYS 76, 77, AND 78 WILL BE ATTACHED TO THE
POLICY ASSESSMENT AIRGRAM.
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